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Syntax of Testimony: Indexical
Objects, Syntax, and Language or
How to Tell a Story Without Words
Till Nikolaus von Heiseler*
Institute of Philosophy, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Language—often said to set human beings apart from other animals—has resisted
explanation in terms of evolution. Language has—among others—two fundamental and
distinctive features: syntax and the ability to express non-present actions and events.
We suggest that the relation between this representation (of non-present action) and
syntax can be analyzed as a relation between a function and a structure to fulfill this
function. The strategy of the paper is to ask if there is any evidence of pre-linguistic
communication that fulfills the function of communicating an absent action. We identify a
structural similarity between understanding indexes of past actions of conspecifics (who
did what to whom) and one of the simplest and most paradigmatic linguistic syntactic
patterns – that of the simple transitive sentence. When a human being infers past events
from an index (i.e., a trace, the conditions of a conspecifics or an animal, a constellation
or an object) the interpreters’ comprehension must rely on concepts similar in structure
and function to the ‘thematic roles’ believed to underpin the comprehension of linguistic
syntax: in his or her mind the idea of a past action or event emerges along with thematic
role-like concepts; in the case of the presentation of, e.g., a hunting trophy, the presenter
could be understood to be an agent (subject) and the trophy a patient (direct object),
while the past action killed is implied by the condition of the object and its possession by
the presenter. We discuss whether both the presentation of a trophy and linguistic syntax
might have emerged independently while having the same function (to represent a past
action) or whether the presentation of an index of a deed could constitute a precursor
of language. Both possibilities shed new light on early, and maybe first, language use.
Keywords: arbitrarisation, index, language evolution, sign-language, storytelling, testimony, trophy,
Peircean linguistics
INTRODUCTION
Language makes us human. It is the basis of cumulative culture, technology, and perhaps our
exceptional success as a species. At the same time, the problem of language evolution has been
considered one of the hardest problems in science today (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003). According
to the Australian science journalist Christine Kenneally (2008), scientists from all relevant fields—
including linguists, geneticists, philosophers, neuroscientists, anthropologists, and psychologists—
have engaged in “a cross-discipline, multidimensional treasure-hunt” for the mechanisms of
language evolution.
Over the past 30 years, during which the origins of language have been studied with increasing
intensity, there have been, according to Hauser et al. (2002), three theoretical issues cross-cutting
the debate. The first and one of the oldest scholarly disagreements about language evolution
concerns whether it is discretely—non-gradually— distinguishable from animal communication.
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Today most scientists agree that “although bees dance, birds sing,
and chimpanzees grunt, these systems of communication differ
qualitatively from human language” (Hauser et al., 2002).
The second issue structuring the debate has been whether
this distinction also implies a discontinuity in the evolutionary
history of language. Evidence supporting the essential difference
between human language and animal communication includes
that they are processed in very different brain regions (Arbib,
2002). Instead of animal communication, the action-recognition
system of primates—composed of mirror neurons—has been
suggested as a basis for the development of the language faculty,
and for good reason: both the mirror neuron system and Broca’s
area (a human brain region linked to speech production) are
located in the frontal lobe of the left hemisphere (Arbib, 2005).
The neurological relatedness of the mirror neuron system (or
any other yet undiscovered brain area necessary for action
recognition) with language (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008)
makes sense functionally; building any sentence depends on
recognizing the conceptual categories of actions (or states or
events) expressed by verbs.
The third issue—crystallizing the current debate—is whether
language emerged gradually over millions of years through the
extension of preexisting communication systems or whether
important, highly specialized features that developed for other
reasons were at one point integrated, making a sudden
development possible.
Besides these three issues (and related to the third), there
has been an intensive debate about whether any principles of
cooperation and pragmatic cognition must have been active in
human interactions before linguistic behavior could begin, some
researchers even suggesting some kind of altruistic behavior—a
distinctive form of cooperation—as the foundation of language
evolution (e.g., Tomasello, 2008). Other researchers explain
anomalous human altruism as an outgrowth of language use
(Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), such as, specifically, the ability to
report the past behavior of individuals (von Heiseler, 2015).
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
If we accept the premise that language evolved for
communication (rather than for thinking), the take-off point
for any discussion on the origin of language is the array of
features uniquely setting language apart from other forms of
communication. A tentative assumption of our proposal is that
there are—among others—two fundamental and distinctive
features of language:
(1) Syntax: Traditionally, the capacity of language to express
an infinite number of propositions using finite means
(productivity) was regarded as its most unique quality
(e.g., Chomsky, 1991). However, the simplest syntactic
structures do not manifest this property as much as they
do the capacity of syntax to represent the relations between
entities in events through argument structure.
(2) Storytelling: It has been supposed that another unique
feature of language is its ability to represent non-present
events, actions, and states. In the last decade, the importance
of narratives has been broadly accepted in cognitive science
(Turner, 1996; Bloom, 2005) and it has been proposed
that narration might have played a crucial role in language
evolution (e.g., von Heiseler, 2014; Corballis, 2014, 2015;
Ferretti et al., 2017).
We suggest that the relation between the ability to present
non-present events and syntax can be analyzed as a relation
between a function and a structure to fulfill this function.
In human language, words are used in syntactic structures
(Chomsky, 1965) expressing thoughts (Jackendoff, 2002), which
most simply and typically represent past, future, or imaginary
actions (Corballis, 2016a,b) or as Pinker (2007, p. 45) puts it:
language gives “us a way to communicate who did what to whom.”
While animal communication consists—for the most part—of
isolated signals interpreted (or more accurately, reacted to) each
in their own right, linguistic utterances can only be understood
when multiple elements are interrelated: minimal syntax – i.e.,
argument structure – seems a necessary condition for referring
to past events. The unique structure of language (syntax) and
its unique function (storytelling) therefore seems closely inter-
related. More evidence that language is adapted to the function
of relating events—and especially human actions—is its complex
temporal logic and the fact that verbs (most of which refer to
actions) dictate the syntax of sentences (Jackendoff, 1983) by
dictating their thematic structure and by inter-relating thematic
roles (such as agent, patient, and instrument). In other words,
the assignment of entities to conceptual (semantic) thematic
roles is an essential function and cognitive pre-condition of
even the simplest forms of syntax.1 Although most linguists
seem to agree that the meanings of thematic roles may vary
substantially between contexts, it has also been noted that the
most basic thematic role distinction—the distinction between
agent and patient—is most clearly pronounced in the use of
the verb “to kill” (Dowty, 1991). Furthermore, it has been
argued that a grammatical construction inter-relating thematic
roles can be interpreted as a basic narrative structure—that “the
abstract narrative structure is projected to create the abstract
grammatical structure” (Turner, 1996, p. 143). This leads us to the
working hypothesis of this paper: syntax can be conceptualized
as structure adapted to the function of communicating who did
what to whom.
Accepting this perspective—and the fact that in evolution,
structure follows (within constructional restrictions and the
constraints of evolutionary history) function—we might imagine
that something would be used to refer to absent actions and that
this would develop into language. This implies that the ability to
refer to past events must, under some circumstances, bequeath
a reproductive advantage, such that the structure of language
would evolve as an adaptation to this function.
1In this paper we discus syntax mainly in its simplest from. This is a verb with
(necessary) arguments and excludes adjuncts, embedding and complex hierarchal
structures. The development from minimal syntax to complex syntax is not the
topic of this paper. We are aware that this view contradicts Chomsky’s notion that
there cannot be any syntax without hierarchy and recursion.
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Non-human animals lack two essential skills: first, the
syntactic ability: they seem to decode each signal instantly
and by itself. Secondly, their ability to understand mimetic
gestures seems very limited. Before we look more deeply into
the problem of mimesis and the requirements for understanding
mimetic gestures, we need to address the syntactic ability and its
essentiality to language.
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM
IMPROVISED SIGN LANGUAGE
The semantics and structure of simple syntax is especially easy
to illustrate using sign language (although the syntax of sign
language is not necessarily less complex than that of spoken
language), because its syntactic structure is sometimes visible in
space. If I sign in American sign language (ASL) the sentence
“I tell you, I will come tomorrow” (meaning, “I promise you
I will come tomorrow”) then the direction of the main verb,
“tell,” marks the subject (I) and the indirect object (you). “I tell
you” is one sign, directed from the sender (I) to the receiver
(you), marking the former as agent and the latter as recipient,
goal, or patient (depending on one’s theoretical commitments).
There is no need to symbolize the agent and the patient
beyond directing the verb. Because the verb “to tell” is trivalent
(creating three slots—the teller, the receiver, and what is told)
we cannot understand the proposition until these three pieces
of information (teller, receiver, and what is told) are understood.
This is to say, the sentence “I tell you” is incomplete in a very
specific way: it produces the question, ‘what are you telling me?’
Thus, the receiver searches for anything—indicated or implied—
that could be told. In this case, she or he will find the phrase
“I come tomorrow.” If the receiver does not find the necessary
information, he or she must guess or request clarification. Most
significantly for us, a single directed mimetic gesture can associate
present objects (e.g., the sender and the receiver) with thematic
roles (e.g., agent and patient) and potentially represent a non-
present action or event. While it is generally impossible to
express a non-present action with a single ‘word’ or morpheme
(conjugated verbs of pro-drop language as must consist of at
least two morphemes, the stem and the inflectional morpheme),
a gesture (e.g., the mimetic sign of the verb) can do so because it
has the potential to integrate present objects (by marking them
for thematic roles), for instance by its direction.
In the theaters of our imaginations, we shall now stage a classic
scene—boy meets girl—in a kind of improvised sign language:
say you are the boy and I am the girl. You come up to me
and point alternately to yourself and to me; then you shape the
right hand as if holding a cup and bring this imaginary cup
to your mouth. Finally, you point in one direction and then
point again to yourself and me, to us. How should I interpret
these signs? Any human would understand that it might mean
something like, “Would you like to have a coffee with me?” Let
us now analyze how this meaning is constructed, there being an
explicit proposition, consisting of signs in a syntactic structure,
and pragmatic implications.
First, the explicit part: you made three gestures: (1) the
alternating pointing at you and me; (2) the mimetic gesture
of drinking from a cup; and (3) a gesture pointing in one
direction. My innate and universally human ability to understand
syntax-like constructions (here the argument structure) is
demonstrated by the fact that I expect such a structure and
comprehend instinctively these three signs as a unity. Without
this syntactic expectation, we would not understand the meaning
of the sentence. We would not even understand that we
did not understand.
Now, let us go a step further and analyze the used signs
one by one and how they manage to connect to each other.
The pointing to you and me means you and I or we (in
no specified grammatical case or thematic relation). In this
improvised signing there is (in contrast to conventional sign
languages) no difference between ‘you and I’ and ‘we.’ Now the
receiver works to a certain extent like a Turing machine; she gets
two items of information—the semantic meaning of the sign (e.g.,
word) and the go-to-command consisting of a search order saying
‘go to the missing syntactic element that is needed for a minimal
well-formed syntactic structure.’
In this case, the ‘we’ will be interpreted as the agent and the
search command is ‘look for a verb that could relate to this agent.’
This is the mimetic gesture, ‘drinking coffee.’ Now we have a
complete sentence: We drink coffee. From this another search
command emerges. This search surpasses syntactic demands,
because the sentence is grammatically complete. Here, we enter
the world of pragmatics. But before we do so, let us reconstruct
how the simple sentence “We drink coffee” is built. It is built out
of two elements: ‘we’ and ‘to drink coffee’ (the latter expressed by
one sign). ‘We’ is a dynamic indexical gesture and ‘to drink coffee’
is the mimetic gesture of drinking from a cup with handle. To
understand the sentence, I must replace ‘you’ (the ‘I’ that was in
implied in your gesture, because you were pantomiming drinking
from a cup) with ‘we.’ The search command and replacement
seem to be basic operations of our syntactic faculty. They work
together; first, every slot needs to be filled, but even if we already
understand a complete sentence, we can always replace elements
when new information comes in, as we shall see later.
As said, the sentence ‘We drink coffee’ is complete. However,
I—the receiver of the completed sentence—ask myself, when
and where? This is a new search command also concerning the
pragmatic meaning. Pragmatics includes knowledge of the world
and puts the utterance in context. Obviously, we are not drinking
coffee in the present. Also, I know that we have never drunk
coffee together before. Because the event of drinking coffee was
not in the past and is not happening in the present, I assume
you are talking about a possible future. So, I (in the scenario:
the girl, the receiver) suppose that the context will tell me where
and when this action should happen. This is to say that the
tense of the proposition is implied and that I need to exclude
all possibilities but one (performing a disjunctive syllogism) to
understand that implication. Now I search for the where. What
I find is the indexical sign for the coffee shop. Instead of pointing
there, you could sign another mimetic gesture that would convey
the information, or you could show a picture of a coffee shop on
your phone. On this first level of pragmatics, the implied sentence
is this: ‘We will have coffee in that coffee shop over there.’ But
there is a second level of pragmatics concerning how to make
sense of the whole situation and the function of the utterance
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within it. This includes the fact that you are a boy and I am a
girl, that we do not know each other and just met for the first
time, and knowledge about the conventions of the society we live
in. On that level, I, the girl, would interpret the utterance as a
polite request or suggestion, something like the question ‘Do you
want to have coffee with me in the coffee shop over there?’ in the
broader context of a possible friendship or flirt.
Now, what is special about language? On the most complex
level, where all information gets integrated into the pragmatics
of everyday life, there seem to be some similarities between
human and non-human animals. Dogs for instance understand
wooing. They have different rituals of courtship, but similar
intentions. Non-human animals can also interpret signals in
context. Furthermore, the pointing at the coffee shop as a
suggestion to go there is within the range of dog comprehension
[in contrast to chimpanzees, who do not understand pointing
under natural conditions (Kaminski et al., 2009)]. However,
the pointing ’me-you-me-you-me-you’ would confuse them and
probably be understood as an invitation to play. There seems to
be no evidence that non-human, untrained animals can integrate
the signs ‘you’ and ‘I’ into ‘we.’
Besides what we like to call the search algorithm of grammar,
replacement (in our case, of the agent) seems a central element of
grammar: I (the girl) saw you making a mimetic gesture drinking
from a cup and I replaced the original agent you (the boy) with
the previously signed gesture I-you-I-you-I-you meaning ‘we.’ If
you now add another gesture to specify a drink—for example by
pantomiming opening a bottle of champagne—this champagne
will replace the coffee. In this case, we reinterpret the already
interpreted signifiers. Either this would be interpreted as a further
suggestion or the first mimetic gesture would be interpreted
more generally as ‘Let’s go for a drink’ and the new sign would
specify the drink.
Now, to pursue the argument further, we need to consider
the cognitive complexity of interpreting syntax. Language is
processed on multiple levels simultaneously. The understood
proposition is not written in stone but ready for modification.
The process of modification includes at least three levels: (1) the
level of semiotics, (2) the syntactic level (connecting semantic
elements and allotting to them thematic roles), and (3) the two
levels of pragmatics. Each level can influence the interpretation
of any other level: when signals do not fit into the pragmatic
or syntactic structure, they get reinterpreted on the semiotic
level (especially, e.g., homophones). It is even possible that
the whole situation gets reinterpreted. Sometimes, likewise, the
thematic roles change in the process of understanding. An
example: “Noam is too angry to call.” is ambiguous. The verb “to
call” produces two slots, the caller and the person called. Now
compare the two ideas: Noam is too angry to make a phone call
versus we should not call Noam because he is so angry. These
are completely different scenarios. The listener must wait for
contextual information and if her assumption changes, she has to
reinterpret the utterance. The vast processing costs of language
result partially from this iterative reinterpretation. Often the
proper construction can only be found by excluding other
possibilities. For example, if we interpret the sentence “Noam
is too angry to eat,” we normally exclude the possibility that
Noam can be eaten—(cf., Chomsky, 2007)—and thus interpret
the sentence something like ‘Noam will not eat anything, because
he is so angry.’
The analysis of these three levels has different functions
for our research: while most parts of the pragmatic level are
not specific to language (some aspects must be older than
language and others built upon it—as shown in our scenario)—
the other two levels offer valuable information concerning
language evolution. Non-human animals lack two essential skills:
first, the ability to search for missing elements and put them
together into a syntactic structure; in contrast, they seem to
decode each signal instantly and by itself. Second, they have
difficulties to understand mimetic gestures such as ‘drinking
from a cup.’
While the syntactic level has long been the center of
attention (mostly in much more complex forms than we can
discuss in this paper), the semiotic level has been a blind
spot in the discussion of language evolution so far. In this
section, we discussed how simple language works; the next
section brings us to the key question of this research: how is
syntactic competence related to the uniquely human faculty for
symbol use, including the ability to produce and understand
mimetic gestures.
PEIRCE’S INDEX, ICON, AND SYMBOL
Peirce (1931), developed a complex semiotic theory, of which
only a small portion became well-known outside his field of
study. This is his classification of signs according to the way they
denote objects:
(1) The index is a sign that points to its object or relates to it
logically. An indexical sign can be either a pointing finger or
such as smoke for fire.
(2) The icon connects the signifier and the signified via
similarity. An iconic sign could be a figurative object or a
mimetic gesture.
(3) The symbol relates the signifier and the signified by
contingent convention; it must be learned; for instance:
letters, words, and technical codes.
In some textbook representation of Pierce’s theory, the index,
the icon, and the symbol are treated as three categories of a
similar value. However, there is an essential discrepancy; while
the distinction between an icon and a symbol is gradual, the
difference between icons and symbols on one hand, and an
index on the other, is discrete. This has essential consequences
for a potential evolutionary theory of language; icons can
undergo gradual development through use. Thus, it is easy
to construct an evolutionary story of increasing abstraction.
A well-known example is the development of Nicaraguan sign
language (NSL) from mostly mimetic (Goldin-Meadow and
Mylander, 1998) home-signs into a conventional full-fledged
language (Senghas et al., 2004). Another example would be
the development of the first letter of our alphabet from the
Egyptian hieroglyph for ox head through the Phoenician Aleph
(see Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1 | Arbitrarisation. (A) Egyptian hieroglyph representing a bull-head,
(B) Phoenician glottal stop [ĳ], first letter of the Phoenician alphabet (C) The
first letter of the Greek alphabet: Alpha [a] – (as a capital and as a small letter).
This gradual transformation from icon (having features
of similarity) to symbol (conventional signs) we refer to
as arbitrarisation—the transformation of the elements of a
communication system toward communicative efficiency—
which is to communicate as much as possible as briefly as
possible, while minimizing the danger of confusion. By the
end of the process each sign is shaped by communicative
efficiency; signs, while conditioned by historical and technical
constraints, tend to find their places in the virtual space
of maximal difference from all (or significant) other signs.2
In the end of this process—driven by the selection of
efficiency, only the differences between signals are finally
encoded. As a necessary side-effect, the analogy to the signified
object vanishes.
This process of arbitrarisation is completely distinct from the
ability of signs to take part in syntactic structures: non-language
signal systems can undergo the process of arbitrarisation and
mimetic and conventional signs can be functional equivalents
within a syntactic structure.3 This can be clarified by cross-cutting
the two properties (see Table 1).
The arbitrariness of signals should not to be confused with
their ability to take part in syntactic structures. This can also
be demonstrated by the alarm calls of vervet monkeys, which
use different signals for different dangers (Seyfarth et al., 1980).
Though it would be technically correct to speak of these calls
as “arbitrary” it may be misleading; especially in contexts where
arbitrariness would be associated with language. For the same
reason, the development of Nicaraguan sign language (or any
other language) cannot be a model for the emergence of the
language faculty, but only a model for arbitrarisation.
At this point we need to adapt our terminology to its subject:
the category symbol is opposed to index and divided into mimetic
symbol (Peirce’s icon) and arbitrary symbol (Peirce’s symbol).
Another argument that mimetic and arbitrary symbols are not
2The first letter of the Phoenician alphabet is revealing for two reasons. Firstly, on
one hand, it is conventional in the sense that nobody will see a bull head in the
sign without knowing about it, but on the other hand, anyone can see the icon of
the bull-head in it once described. Secondly, because the production of the sign
(drawing it) influenced the development; the line from upper-left to lower-right is
longer than would be expected.
3Arbitrarisation can be a fascinating topic and a model for describing language
change (e.g., from Old to Modern English). Impressive work has been done by
Luc Steels, who let Sony-sponsored little robots communicate until they equalized
their signals for some colors and objects; and by researchers from the University
of Edinburgh, who showed that conventionalization can also be influenced by the
limitations and constraints of human memory (Cornish et al., 2017). However,
neither has anything to do with the origin of language.





Smoke for fire Words
Mimetic sign (Icon) The shape of a shadow
(and any technical imaging)
Sign for “house” in
American sign language
(ASL)
discretely distinguishable is that some signs in sign language
are conventional and mimetic at the same time; you cannot
understand them without learning them, but having learned
them, you understand the mimetic relation between signifier and
signified. In a nutshell: the difference between arbitrary signs
(Peirce’ icons) and conventional signs (Peirce’ symbols) is only
gradual, while the distinction between the two on one hand and
indexes on the other is fundamental. From this perspective the
emergence of language must include the transcendence of the
essential distinction between the world of indexes and the cosmos
of mimetic or arbitrary symbols.
The idea presented in this paper is based on two premises: (1)
evolution adapts whatever already exists for new purposes, (2)
While not all indexes are of natural meaning, all signs with natural
meaning can be interpreted as indexical. The hypothesis that
language evolution takes off from indexes is suggested by these
premises: the first premise suggests that non-natural meaning
(cf. Grice, 1957) developed from natural meaning and from
the second premise we can deduce that non-natural meaning
means indexical.
Indexes are closely related to the world itself, up to a point, that
sometimes the line between objects and indexes of an objects blur.
Is the ear of a donkey behind a bush an index of the donkey or
the donkey itself? In a more radical view, the world presents itself
to us in the form of indexes, because all of our sense perception
could be called indexical.
Symbols can refer to displaced (future, past, imaginary)
actions through minimal syntactic structures, while the ability
of indexes to refer to displaced actions is inflexible and
limited. While an indexical finger (pointing) only can refer to
present objects or events, indexical objects – as we will see –
sometimes can refer to past actions or events. In the model
presented here we suggest a transformation from a natural
index to an index presentation. In the next passage we will
investigate the differences between the world of indexes and
language more closely.
THREE ASPECTS OF THE UNIQUENESS
OF LANGUAGE
While non-human vertebrates (including non-human primates)
live—roughly speaking—in a world of indexes (which in most
cases refer to the here and now), people also live in a
symbolic world (including mental time traveling and the inner
presentation of non-present entities of all sorts, including
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significant others and persons of reference). Most researchers
agree that mental time traveling is limited or non-existent
in non-human animals (Suddendorf, 2013). The gap between
indexes and symbols can be investigated in terms of their
different functions and in terms of the cognitive requirements
for the comprehension of mimetic and symbolic signs and
operations. While an index, outside of human language, generally
stands alone as a mere indicator that something is the case
(including something’s existence), mimetic or arbitrary symbols
are necessary for syntactic structures; no grammatical sentence
can be constructed out of indexes alone.
The abilities of non-human animals to understand
spontaneously new mimetic symbols, such as pantomime
and mimetic objects, are limited to non-existent. Great apes have
been conditioned to use some gestures from conventional sign
language, but there is no evidence that they can spontaneously
understand new mimetic symbols. They also find it difficult to
imitate gestures without objects (Tennie et al., 2012). In contrast,
people not only comprehend mimetic symbols, but seem to have
an innate attraction to mimesis (play) and mimetic objects (such
as symbolic toys and puppets).
Further evidence of this difference between human beings
and other primates lies in a known correlation between the
comprehension of actions (or lack thereof) and the behavior
of mirror-neurons: non-human primates seem to understand
(categorize) only “transitive actions” (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004): actions involving objects or other animals. Their mirror-
neurons do not fire when they observe non-transitive actions
(such as walking or dancing—actions of an agent not involving
another animal or an object) (Luppino and Rizzolatti, 2001).
In the case of human beings, the nervous system reacts
not only to non-transitive actions (Maeda et al., 2002),
but also to simulations of actions such as picking up an
imaginary cup or any other pantomime (Buccino et al., 2001;
Grèzes et al., 2003).
The uniqueness of language includes at least three aspects: (1)
syntax (in its most basic form: the argument structure: the verb
valency with thematic roles), (2) on the level of the function,
the representation of non-present (such as past or future) events
or actions, and (3) at the semiotic level, the overcoming of the
discontinuity between index and mimetic symbol.
Any explanation for language evolution needs to account
for how these discontinuities could have been overcome. The
classical generative theories concerned mainly the emergence
of syntax (e.g., Chomsky, Pinker, Jackendoff); during the last
decades, there have been several suggestions regarding the
evolution of storytelling (e.g., Dunbar, Corballis, von Heiseler);
however, the unique semiotic aspect of language evolution has
been widely overlooked.
REPRODUCTIVE ADVANTAGE COULD
HAVE PRECEDED THE INTENTION TO
BE UNDERSTOOD
We have argued that one of the most unique and central functions
of language is the representation of absent actions and that
this function depends on syntax-like conceptual structures and
(mimetic or arbitrary) symbols. Why is it—in most cases—
impossible to refer to an absent action using only indexes?
As we saw in the boy-meets-girl scenario, it is possible (if
the agents of the related action are present) to refer to the
agents by pointing. What about the verb? There are at least two
ways to refer to an action by pointing: pointing at a present
action or at an object that implies an action. However, this
would require that the action in question occur in the presence
of the communicative partners or that an object that implies
the action is present. Language requires referring to actions
without these strict limitations. The simplest way to refer to
any absent action is to imitate that action. Such imitation may
be done without objects that would be involved in the real
action. In sign language, such signs are called manipulators (in
contrast to substitutors). Manipulators imitate an action (for
example drinking from a cup), while substitutors imitate an
object or a part of it. For instance, the sign for champagne can
combine a manipulator (opening the bottle) and a substitutor (the
effervescent champagne squiring out of the bottle). The benefit
of mimetic signs is that they can refer without presupposing any
semiotic conventions.
Thus, we have claimed that representing absent actions
requires syntax-like structure and mimetic or arbitrary symbols.
This urgently compels the question of how and why such activity
could have begun; what sort of interactions could form the
basis for an adaptation that would evolve into the ability to
communicate an absent action, by using a mimetic symbol (of
this action) within a minimal argument structure.
A natural place to look for this bridge would be among natural
indexical signs, for several reasons; (1) they occur automatically
in a natural environment; (2) they are likely to be related to
food gathering, hunting and territorial conflicts (e.g., animal
tracks, animal homes, feces, evidences of activities of conspecifics
such as chipped stones and broken branches, or dangers
(of fire and flood for instance) making their interpretation
subject to natural selection; interpreting such signs could spell
the difference between reproductive success and otherwise;
and (3) our ancestors could have responded instinctively to
some such natural signs before the ability to interpret them
consciously evolved.
In general, as stated above, indexes refer to present objects,
actions or events. Nevertheless, there are exceptions: for instance,
traces left by an animal’s passage can indicate (for those that can
read them) that an animal of a certain kind recently performed
some action (such as walking or scratching its back on a tree).
In such a case, even if the interpreter imagines a past event
(implying concepts of actions, agents, and perhaps other thematic
roles) there seems no way that reading traces could develop into
something language-like; because unlike interpreting language,
reading an animal’s trace lacks the potential for reciprocal
communication; the creator of the index (e.g., the animal the
scratched its back) is not present and in most or all cases has no
intention to communicate.
However, there exists a class of situations in which the receiver
can infer a past action of a present individual; for instance, if
a dominant individual shows signs of repletion while another
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individual gulps down some flesh it bites off from a bone, the
observer can infer that the dominant individual gave the bone
to the other individual after eating to satisfaction. Also, in this
case there is no intention to communicate. Another example:
an observer might infer that the individual carrying a hand ax
produced it himself.
In both cases, the past of the observed individual might
be imagined, and thus a non-present event conceptually
represented; thereby valuable information about the social world
could be transmitted. We know that primate societies depend
on a variety of sophisticated cognitive skills, and it has been
claimed that such abilities evolved in response to social demands
(Humphrey, 1976) and action reasoning (Fabbri-Destro and
Rizzolatti, 2008). It seems likely that being able to respond
effectively to a social situation by inferring from indices to past
actions would constitute a reproductive advantage, enabling the
‘interpreter’ to behave more adaptively (whether the signs are
consciously interpreted or responded to appropriately without
conscious thought); for instance: if individual A observes that
B is injured and moving away submissively from individual C,
A may ‘conclude’ that B lost a fight. As a consequence, A will
challenge B before picking a hierarchical fight with C. Thus, the
ability to interpret such indexes could develop (because the genes
that encode the ability to develop the capacity to interpret such
indexes would spread through the population).
In most scenarios of this class, the observer can infer a past
action or constellation regardless of whether the transmitted
information is reproductively beneficial to the individual
observed and thus “wishes” to communicate such a past action.
To identify which cases might be relevant for language
evolution, we need to introduce two distinctions concerning the
information transmitted:
(1) The information could be of the type to give the individual
observed either a reproductive advantage or a disadvantage.
In situations in which understanding the past would
bequeath an advantage to the observed individual, it would
be beneficial for the observed individual to draw the
attention of the potential interpreter to any indexes of the
relevant past actions (or to hide them in the converse case).
(2) Information about the immediate past can be inferred either
from a whole situation or from an object alone. While the
inferences drawn from a whole situation will most often
concern the immediate past and the present location (or
one within sight) objects can be carried over a distance.
Another difference between drawing inference form an
entire situation versus from an object is that, regarding an
object, the observed individual has more control over the
communication: an object can be presented or hidden, while
the inferences drawn from a situation cannot always be
controlled as well.
We are particularly interested in situations in which it might
be advantageous for an individual to communicate the past,
because this needs to be the case to play a role in language
evolution: it must be beneficial for the speaker to communicate
something (only traits bequeathing differential fitness can be
subject to evolution). The most promising scenario to be
developed into a communicative situation is one in which the
past can be inferred from an object and such inference gives the
communicating individual a reproductive advantage.
The presentation of an indexical object could somehow
be considered functionally equivalent to a linguistic utterance
representing a past action; but there is also a fundamental
difference: in the simplest situations in which the observer infers
a past event from an indexical object, the sender need not intend
to communicate the past action consciously.
If displaying indexical objects gave the producers of the
indexes—implying their own past actions—a reproductive
advantage, an index-displaying behavior would spread through
the population. The system could even evolve without the
presenter of the indexical object “wanting” to communicate
a past action—like male Bowerbirds building a structure and
decorating it with sticks and brightly colored objects to attract
mates. In contrast, whenever an indexical object (including a
traditional trophy of hunting or war) is presented as a trophy,
the presenter is trying to communicate a past event (similarly
to a modern language user who wishes to be understood).4
Possible precursors of this complex scenario include one in which
the system would work without the presenter even wanting to
be understood. Given a sufficient selective pressure, the ability
of presenters to understand that audiences understand could
probably subsequently develop over a long period of time.
But for the development to start, neither joint attention nor
the competence to attribute mental states to others (such as
understanding the understanding) must be in place; rather, both
could develop through use.
Regardless of whether such later developments would have
been possible, the point to be made here is: understanding the
representation of a non-present action by means of an indexical
object (even if not intended by the presenter) implies a conceptual
structure similar to that of the representation of a situation using
a syntax-like structure: the elements of the situation must be
classified in terms of thematic roles: in the case of a trophy the
presenter is conceptualized as an agent and the trophy as patient,
while the action kill is implied by the condition of the patient;
thereby information about a past deed can be transmitted.
DISCUSSION AND SOME SUSPICIONS
In this paper, we have tried to show that there is a remarkable
structural and functional similarity between the cognitive
foundations of linguistic syntax and the understanding of the
presentation of indexical signs such as a skillfully made tools or
hunting trophies. Hypothetically there are three possibilities:
(1) Language developed first (e.g., as inner language or for
communication), after which humans could interpret
4We define trophy as an object implying that the presenter performed an action
that requires exceptional abilities and personal qualities—in the case of hunting
trophies, exceptional hunting abilities, strength, and courage. Thus, a trophy is
an object, which communicates something about the presenter of the trophy that
is beneficial for him to communicate. The cost of acquiring such a trophy might
include putting oneself in jeopardy. In this case it is a form of expensive signaling.
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presentations of indexical signs referring to the past—such
as trophies—using linguistic categories.
(2) Linguistic syntax and the understanding of the presentation
of an indexical sign have the same foundation (e.g., mind
traveling or the ability to conceptualize) and then develop
independently in the two domains. This would make
them homologous concerning their common foundation
and analogous in their later separate development; similar
function (to refer to a non-present event) enforces
similar structure.
(3) The understanding of the presentation of an indexical
object was a source adaptation for language.
The claim of this paper is that regardless of which scenario is
true, language evolved for its capacity to refer to past actions (and
later other displaced – past, future, imaginary events –) and that
this capacity could come under evolutionary pressure in various
scenarios including trophy presentation. A much stronger claim
(with much more exploratory power) would be to argue for the
third option: inferring a past event from a present sign being a
prerequisite for and progenitor of linguistic syntax, including the
possibility that the presentation of an indexical object functioned
as a precursor for linguistic utterances referring to the past.
In order to further consider the likelihood of this third option,
it behooves us to consider more closely the types of indexical
objects most likely to have played such a role in human evolution.
We have argued that one essential distinction between
language and other forms of communication can be described
semiotically: while non-human animals live in a world of indexes,
language depends on mimetic or conventional symbols. It seems
impossible to render a syntactic structure that refers to an absent
action using only indexical signs. In general, indexes refer to the
present, although there are exceptions, such as the traces left
behind, and other examples given above. Such indexes that do
refer to the past can be either complex situations or objects and
the information about the agent of the indexed action can be
either beneficial or adverse to the agent of the action. In the case
of a display whereby comprehension is beneficial to the producer,
it could be plausible for display-making behavior to evolve.
Now, we could render a menu of different possibilities:
individuals may make objects that display their abilities, such
as painted shells and skillfully made tools. How would objects
develop during cultural transmission if they were selected for
skillfulness instead of usefulness? This might be one beginning
of simple forms of art. If displaying such skillfully made object
would produce a selective advantage (e.g., by female choice) a
runaway process (positive feed-back loop) might start.
Another class of indexical objects could be corpses of animals
killed in the hunt. Differently from the skillful crafting of objects,
hunting shapes the ecological conditions in which a population
survives through interactions between the hunting population
and their environment. Many people—e.g., Ardrey (1976)—
believe that good hunters are selected according to the nutritive
value of their abilities only. If this would be the case, selection
would be based on the fact that families of good hunters (and
thereby their genes) would flourish while other die of hunger.
Selection would be mostly negative.
Hunting abilities would therefore only adapt when confronted
with new environments and environmental changes. With
negative selection (death by hunger) only the families of the
worst hunters would be likely to die off entirely, if any;
because people can survive without meat (on the other hand,
high-protein food, such as meat, could definitely increase the
average height and brain development of the children of good
hunters). However, if the best hunters were always selected,
hunting abilities could develop in a runaway-process, because
competition would never end, since all hunters of the same
group are competitors and hunting techniques and technology
can improve with every new generation.
Also, if hunters displaying trophies were positively selected—
due to social status or by sexual selection, for instance—it could
become a runaway process. This might raise the value of rare
trophies (such as dangerous or hard to hunt animals) over the
mere nutritional value. This hypothesis is supported by the fact
that when Homo sapiens spread around the world, the first
animals to disappear were large game (Martin, 2005).
If hunting abilities evolve for the better in a population,
this group will also have a competitive advantage in territorial
conflicts with other groups, since hunting big game and group
conflicts require similar strategies, weapons and abilities. This
makes it likely that groups in which such positive feedback circles
emerge would displace all other groups—who hunt merely for
nutritional purposes. Because it is a good choice for a female is to
mate with the most successful hunters, it is possible for the ability
to interpret the value of a trophy to have evolved.
Therefore, although we wish to primarily support the more
general thesis that the presentation of some sorts of indexical
objects could have catalyzed the evolution of the language
faculty, as precursors of utterances, we have examined the
presentation of ‘trophies’ in particular as a case that most clearly
demonstrates our argument.
Although our ancestors were not chimpanzees, comparing
chimpanzee behavior with ours is a commonly accepted starting
point for understanding the development of unique human
faculties. Female chimpanzees mate more often with males that
share meat with them (Gomes and Boesch, 2009). This behavior
has been interpreted as sexual selection (von Heiseler, 2015).
If females were to choose mates presenting an index of a rare
kill over nutritional value (a choice that could be the result of
runaway process that could have started, because the orientation
toward rare kills produces more distinctions), they would choose
mates presenting hunting trophies, giving such male conspecifics
reproductive advantage.
It is also possible that the presentation of corpses of animals
killed in the hunt would raise the status of the presenter among
the males of the group and that the female choice would orient
toward that status. This could also occur without any mental
representation of past deeds: the system could work without
anyone conceptualizing the events leading to the presentation
of the hunted animals. A corpse of animals killed in the hunt
would only turn into indexical objects when they produce mental
representations of a past deed. There is another important point
that concerns motivation and group structure: if trophies were
to motivate actions that benefit the group, the costs that are
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paid by the individuals for their expensive signaling could cash
out for the group.
It is possible that different groups would favor different
indexical objects. Some of them could be more beneficial for the
group than others. If in one group, for instance, war trophies in
the form of body parts were preferred, this might give this group
an advantage over groups living in the same habitat that favor
rare objects and replace them slowly. Another possibility would
be a skillfully manufactured object. Individuals would compete
either by winning hunting or war trophies or by excelling in
the artfulness of produced objects. Although both could play
a role, trophy presentation seems particularly worthwhile to
consider, because if then—after evolving, the tendency to choose
trophy-bearers—females were to comprehend the implications of
a trophy (because this should give her a reproductive advantage),
this would constitute conceptualization of a past event.
Such concepts, as we have seen, would have to include
categorizations similar to the thematic roles shaping syntactic
structure. In this constellation, the instinct to show the trophy
to a group or to a female could evolve without the intention
to be understood. Because in this scenario awareness of the
attentions of others can bequeath reproductive advantages, this
awareness could have become subject to a selective pressure;
the ability to understand how one is seen by others could
have thus develop. We should consider whether a mimetic
sign representing, for instance, killing, could have also emerged
under such conditions. If such a mimetic gesture were to
have been understood, the abilities to perform and understand
such gestures could be put under a selective pressure and
this might have opened the whole world of human actions
to be symbolized.
SUMMARY
While not all indexes are of natural meaning, all signs with
natural meaning can be interpreted as indexes. The idea that
signs with non-natural meaning (cf. Grice, 1957) developed from
indexes is therefore built on the idea that evolution often adapts
what exists for new purposes. If we consider female choice a
pressure in human evolution, the relevant indexical signs would
somehow refer to the fitness of males. Indexes of fitness need to be
selective and true, therefore they are often costly (Zahavi, 1975).
We saw that one of the most essential functions of language is
referring to absent actions and events. Trophies (as defined in
this paper) have a similar function. At the same time, they can be
costly signals. A group in which females choose trophy presenters
would presumably spread through the habitat, because it would
give a group an advantage in hunting, territorial conflicts, and
even food gathering.
Two further reasons support the plausibility of this narrative:
(1) The system could work with no comprehension (if the females
simply select the trophy presenter without understanding the
implications of the trophy) and that comprehension—including
the imagination of a absent action—could have developed
if it improved female choice. (2) The system could evolve
gradually from a behavior we find in today’s chimpanzees:
meat presents to females indicate the hunting ability of
male chimps and make mating with the donor more likely
(Gomes and Boesch, 2009).
The empirically testable prediction of this paper is: the
understanding of a trophy representation involves the same brain
region as the understanding of a linguistic utterance signifying
the same (and therefore producing a similar imagination).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have tried to show that there is a structural
and functional similarity between the syntax of language and
the presentation of an indexical object—thus we assumed
that understanding the latter could constitute a precursor
for understanding the former. We argued on one hand, that
syntactic conceptual categories are a necessary precondition
for entertaining thoughts about past actions, so that their
understanding should pre-exist utterances about them. Such
concepts could have developed in varieties of situations,
one of which is trophy presentation (setting aside the less
likely possibilities that language preceded the understanding
of trophies or developed coincidentally). This is to say: we
could not prove that language evolved in the context of
presenting a trophy. However, this hypothesis is supported by
seven arguments:
(1) A reverse engineering argument; the concept to kill implies
the thematic relations agent and patient in a prototypical
way (Dowty, 1991) and these could have constructed a
necessary foundation for the entire range of thematic roles
now used in every language of the world. With the verb
killing, the thematic structure of agent-action-patient is
most clearly pronounced.
(2) A well-known issue with language evolution—that
language is too cheap for sexual selection—could be solved
as follows: initially mimetic gestures would occur only as a
supplement in the context of trophy-presentation (showing
the killing as part of the presentation); after stories begin
to circulate, the evidential function (truth indicator) could
shift from the trophy itself to the circulating narratives:
every story would be controlled by other witnesses and
their storytelling (this will also include the development of
proper names because the retelling of stories is not possible
with I-narratives alone).
(3) One problem with the emergence of language (e.g., through
mimetic gestures) is that it could only have evolved
by improving the reproductive success of the alleles of
speakers. This would probably be the case if the first mimetic
gesture developed in the context of trophy presentation.
(4) Problem of altruism. The (direct or indirect) sexual selection
of presenters of trophies could explain why altruistic
behavior may be evolutionarily stable. Once narrations
circulated within populations and the abilities emerged to
attribute respect and disrespect to individuals depending
on the stories circulating about them, a new social structure
would have developed—what we would like to call narrative
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altruism. In this case altruism would be a result of language
evolution, in contrast to theories that altruism was a
necessary condition for the development of language.
(5) The paradox of the first linguistic utterance: language (as
understood in this paper) needs a minimal complexity:
argument structure (an n-valent verb + n arguments).
Such a structure seems too complex to be produced
spontaneously and understood instinctively within a
communicative act. There are two common suggestions
to solve this problem: some researchers believe holistic
protolanguage to be the precursor of language; others
believe that words emerge first and later syntax. Both
concepts are problematic: (a) Holistic expressions [like
drumming on a tree trunk, for instance, as a chimpanzee
male may do to indicate a hunting trip is to begin
(Stanford, 1999), interpreted as the holistic expression
“Let’s go hunting”] are not linguistic utterances, but a
common part of animal communication. (b) On the other
hand, a sign that refers to an object [e.g., a warning
call that distinguishes between eagle, snake, and feline
predator (Seyfarth et al., 1980)] could emerge; but how
syntax emerge from such calls? In the common view
there cannot be any syntax without words. But aren’t
words—differently from other signals—only words because
they can participate in syntactic structures? If trophy
comprehension preceded linguistic utterances, this paradox
could be solved: a syntax-like structure could emerge
without words (presenter = agent, trophy = patient, verb
implied in the state of the patient). As a second step a first
‘word’ (verb) in the form of a mimetic gesture could have
emerged signifying the killing.
(6) Overcoming the problem of circularity. Logically, a behavior
cannot be performed without the ability to perform it.
However, in the evolutionary process, this relation between
behavior and the ability to perform a certain behavior
is inverted. The justification for this strange inversion of
reasoning (Dennett, 2009) is that a behavior (with selective
advantage) is the cause of (the development) of the ability
to perform this behavior. This paradox can be unfolded
in the evolutionary process: an action can be performed
in a primitive way and maybe even by chance. If this
performance increases the reproduction of the allele of the
individual, the genetic foundation of the ability can improve
over generations by natural or sexual selection. For this
process to happen, we need two conditions: (a) the behavior
in question needs to generate a reproductive advantage and
(b) among the individuals of a population there must be
variations of the ability to perform the behavior resulting
in variation of reproductive success (fitness). In the case
of comprehension (a) a simple—maybe unconscious—form
of a behavior emerges, (b) the reproductive advantage of
the behavior can be improved by comprehension. In
our example, in its simplest form, females choose males
that retrieve trophies without interpreting the trophies
as trophies (and thereby as information about an absent
action). The development could start with a behavior we see
with Chimpanzees: males hunt and share some of the meat
with some females (Gomes and Boesch, 2009). The females
are then more likely to mate with them. If we interpret
this as a form of sexual selection (evidence for this is that
females – though they are sometimes present – do not join
the hunt)5, the signal could get more and more selective,
becoming the index of a rare kill. This structure could
develop toward understanding of the implications of the
index (trophy), including the imagination of a past action.
This would suggest that the conceptualizing of a past action
would first be selected in females and spread from them in
the next generation to both sexes as is in general the case
when the trait is not a disadvantage for either sex.
(7) Sexual selection by one sex has at least two conditions: the
freedom of choice of the sexual partner and a difference in
the parental investment between sexes. The cost difference
in parental investment between the sexes correlates with the
choosiness of the selecting sex [in most cases the females
(Bateman, 1948)] and the choosiness of the selecting sex
correlates with the cost of the courtship behavior of the
chosen sex (Trivers, 1972). This is to say: the differences
in parental investment corresponds with the cost of the
courtship behavior of the selected sex (in most cases the
males). As the total amount of parental care would have
grown along with the increasingly earlier births of our
ancestors, the costs of the courtship behavior for the
males should grow and the females should become more
and more discriminating (and the behavioral dimorphism
get accordingly more expressed). In this situation the
reproductive success of females relies heavily on the best
mating partner choice, because the best strategy to pass
their genes onto the next generation is to combine them
with good genes. Non-human animals make their choices
based mainly on the male’s social status and perceptible
appearance. If, females develop comprehension of the
implications of indexes such as trophies, they can improve
their mating choice competence. This would even make
small differences in the comprehension of indexical signs
evolutionary relevant.
To defend the presumably controversial hypothesis that
language actually evolved from trophy presentation, there are
good reasons for narrowing down the time corridor for when
this development could have happened (though this paper was
not about dating when language evolved). One reason would
be: we have assumed some elements of social structure and a
behavioral sexual dimorphism among our ancestors. For this
structure to be verifiable by empirical data we need to know
what time period we are talking about. Obviously, we are
not discussion contemporary populations of hunter-gatherers.
In these societies language is in place and as a result stories
about individuals circulate. These circulating narratives store and
distribute the reputation of the individuals. This makes certain
forms of cooperation and costly (apparent altruistic) behavior
likely (von Heiseler, 2015).
5Behavioral sexual dimorphism is often an index for sexual selection.
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It was suggested that the exceptional brain growth of
the Homo erectus seems to have been associated with the
development of uniquely human cognitive faculties, including
simple language (Everett, 2017). Now, if trophy presentation
was prior to linguistic communication it must have occurred
even earlier. Because developments often start rather slowly
it is likely that between the first meat presents to females,
through the instinctive tendency to present trophies, and the
slow dawning of the imagination of past actions, to the full
understanding of indexical signs of displaced actions, could have
taken millions of years.
Our approach corresponds to the function-first idea:
something (whatever exists and can be used) is used to fulfill
a function (suggesting a past action) which causes selective
pressure to further develop that function.
Obviously, we have not presented a complete scenario for
language evolution here. Such a theory would have much else to
explain and to explain the ‘trophy’ selection scenario in greater
detail. Here we have tried to only establish the unique role
indexical signs are likely to have played in language evolution,
and to suggest that trophy selection provides an ideal exemplar
of the principle.
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